Retirement Financing Dilemmas Facing Singapore by Asher, Mukul G.
Hitotsubashi University Repository
TitleRetirement Financing Dilemmas Facing Singapore







International Conference on 










Mukul G. Asher 
Professor, Public Policy Programme 













PIE and COE/RES, Hitotsubashi University 
 




Research Assistance by Arathi Jayaram and Amarendu Nandy is gratefully acknowledged. The 
usual caveat applies.  
Abstract 
 
Singapore’s retirement financing arrangements are almost solely based 
on a mandatory savings pillar administered by the Central Provident 
Fund (CPF). Over the years, there have been many additional 
objectives such as housing and healthcare financing, which have also 
been entrusted to the CPF. Singapore is now an affluent and rapidly 
aging society. It is also searching for ways to regain competitiveness in 
the face of globalization and increasing competition from other 
countries. Even as the need for adequate social security provision is 
growing, Singapore’s strong revealed preference for use of the CPF for 
socio-economic engineering and for political control are creating many 
dilemmas. These centre around governance, design of schemes, 
investment policies, and whether to shift to more appropriate multi-tier 
system. This paper analyzes the nature of these dilemmas and suggests 
measures which could assist in addressing them. The paper asserts that 
the current mono-centric power structure and the strong proclivity to 
regard even basic socio-economic information as a strategic tool rather 
than a public good are major constraints in addressing the dilemmas.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Singapore is an affluent and rapidly aging city-state in Southeast Asia
1. Singapore’s 
retirement financing arrangements are almost solely based on a mandatory savings tier 
administered by the Central Provident Fund (CPF)
2 (Asher and Newman, 2003). There is 
therefore an absence of social risk pooling. It is thus ironic that a state which advertises 
itself as communitarian requires all of the retirement financing risks such as investment 
risk in the accumulation phase and longevity and inflation risks during the pay-out or 
decumulation phase to be borne by the individuals alone. In addition, the political risk of 
current arrangements is also borne by individuals without any benefit of social risk-
pooling. 
 
Singapore’s reliance on a single-tier for retirement financing ignores the accumulated 
evidence over the last two decades that mandatory savings schemes cannot by themselves 
be sufficient in providing adequate and accessible retirement income security (Orzag and 
Stiglitz, 2001; Gill, Packard and Yermo, 2003). A multi-tier system is desirable on social 
and economic grounds as it provides diversification of avenues and therefore risks from 
which retirement financing is derived; and permits addressing of specific types of risks 
by different tiers and schemes. Such a system, particularly when it includes the zero tier 
of social assistance through the government budget, and the first tier social risk pooling 
through social insurance, permits alleviation of old age poverty, and maintenance of  
accustomed standards of living in retirement. The importance of each tier for a given 
country at a particular point in time may vary according to the level of development, 
political philosophy impacting on how a society views itself, demographic, and historical 
and cultural factors.  
 
As at September 30, 2003, the total membership of the CPF was 3 million, but only 1.3 
million or 43% were active members. The active members constituted about three-fifths 
of the total labor force. The foreign workers at all levels are not eligible for CPF 
membership. The self-employed may join voluntarily, but few do. Given that more than a 
quarter of Singapore’s labor force is foreign, the labor force coverage of the CPF may be   3
regarded as satisfactory. The total number of active employers was 78, 724.  The total 
members’ balances as at September 30, 2003 were S$102.1 billion, 66% of 2002 Gross 
National Income (GNI). This indicates high level of retirement savings in relation to GNI.  
 
The current contribution rates to the CPF vary with age, and are subject to a wage ceiling 
(Table 1). The proportion of the contributions allocated for housing, retirement, and 
health care also varies by age. The rate structure is therefore quite complex.  It is 
noteworthy that the rates decline with age, and so does the amount allocated for 
retirement purposes. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Over the years, there have been many additional objectives such as housing and health 
care financing, which have also been entrusted to the CPF (Table 2). As a result, it is 
important to note that various schemes reflecting different objectives have been added 
over the years. They have usually reflected ad-hoc responses to a particular economic or 
social problem at a particular point in time. They are therefore not a product of an overall 
system-wide view. Thus, Medisave scheme, which essentially represents mandatory 
savings allocated for acute healthcare services, was introduced in 1983 when the 
government wanted to increase the share of total health expenditure accounted for by the 
individuals. More recently, the contribution rates of the CPF and the rate ceiling were 
reduced as part of macroeconomic stabilization policies.  
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
Affluent and rapidly aging Singapore is searching for ways to regain competitiveness in 
the face of globalization and increasing competition from other countries. Even as the 
need for adequate social security provision is growing, Singapore’s strong revealed 
preference for use of the CPF for socio-economic engineering and for political control are 
creating many dilemmas. These centre around governance, design of schemes, 
investment policies, and whether to continue to rely on a single-tier system. This paper   4
analyzes the nature of these dilemmas and suggests measures which could assist in 
addressing them. The paper asserts that the current mono-centric power structure and the 
strong proclivity to regard even basic socio-economic information as a strategic tool 
rather than a public good are major constraints in addressing the dilemmas.  
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the above dilemmas and suggest possible 
ways to address them. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses 
the dilemmas noted above. Broad directions of reforms which may help address the 
dilemmas are presented in Section 3. The final section provides the concluding 
observations.  
 
2. The Dilemmas 
 
This section discusses various retirement financing dilemmas facing Singapore.  
 
 2.1 Governance: 
There are six core functions which any provident or pension fund organization needs to 
perform (Ross, 2000). These are: First, the reliable collection of contributions, taxes and 
other receipts; second, the payment of benefits in a timely and correct way without any 
side-payments; third, the timely repayment in case of pre-retirement loans; fourth, the 
effective financial management and productive investment of the assets; fifth, the 
maintenance of an effective communication network, which also includes development of 
accurate data and records-keeping mechanism; and sixth, the provision of adequate 
support for all these activities, including the production of financial statements and 
reports. 
 
In addition to the organization specific core functions, there are also broader areas of 
governance which are similar to the corporate governance. These include composition of 
the governing board of the provident or pension fund; disclosure norms, actuarial 
valuations and their disclosure; fiduciary responsibility; transparency; and accountability. 
A combination of statutory requirements and conventions is needed to ensure good 
governance in these areas. From an overall economy’s point of view, the governance   5
structure should permit professionalism and system-wide perspective.  This usually 
requires an independent provident and pension fund regulator. 
 
Singapore’s CPF is under Ministry of Manpower. CPF has administrative, but not policy 
autonomy. The Minister appoints the representatives from the government, employers, 
employees and professional experts. Singapore does not have an independent provident 
or pension fund regulator.  
 
The CPF has performed with high degree of effectiveness as far as the collection of 
contributions, maintenance of individual accounts, and administration of various rather 
complex benefit schemes, including the timely repayment at the withdrawal age are 
concerned. It has invested heavily in information technology, and has acquired 
considerable capacity for generating management information systems and detailed data 
on members.  
 
The governance record of the CPF concerning investment management, fiduciary 
responsibilities which require it to perform in the sole interest of the members and in 
provision of timely and relevant information to stakeholders
3  however is in need of 
considerable improvement. 
 
A comparison of the CPF’s Annual Report and the data available in its website with those 
of Malaysia’s Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF), Hong Kong’s Mandatory Provident 
Fund Schemes Authority, and information provided by the Chilean pension system 
demonstrates the paucity of relevant and timely data provided by the CPF. This reflects 
the strong tendency in Singapore to regard even basic socio-economic information as a 
strategic resource to be employed by the policy makers for tactical purposes rather than 
regarding such information as a public good. The purpose is to prevent rigorous research, 
analysis and development of expertise, with a view to controlling public debate on social 
security. The governance shortcomings of the CPF concerning investment policies and 
design of various schemes will become clearer when these aspects will be discussed 
shortly.      6
 
The above discussion suggests that the key governance dilemma is how to obtain services 
of Board members who are both competent and independent-minded in a country with 
mono-centric power structure; where information is regarded as a strategic instrument 
rather than a public good; and when socio-economic engineering and political control are 
the overriding objectives. 
 
 
2.2 Design of Schemes: 
 
As noted earlier, the schemes under the CPF have been introduced at different points 
in time, and their design details have been altered fairly frequently (Table 2). The 
fundamental dilemma in this case is that too many objectives (such as housing, 
healthcare, macro-economic stabilization, developing Singapore as a funds 
management centre, and financing tertiary education, etc.) are sought to be achieved 
through a single CPF instrument. This is inconsistent with the theory of economic 
policy which suggests that a policy targeted at more than one objective will result in 
sub-optimal outcomes (Salvatore 2003). 
 
The most recent illustration of this dilemma concerns the reductions in the 
contribution rates and in the wage ceiling for CPF contributions which were 
announced in 2003. The main purpose of these reductions is to reduce wage costs and 
make Singapore businesses more competitive. But this measure will effectively 
reduce the retirement income security that the CPF can provide. This is elaborated in 
Section 2.3.2. The use of retirement financing mechanism for short run stabilization 
purposes is not new in Singapore. When Singapore was growing rapidly until the mid 
1980s, the CPF rates were frequently raised to reduce domestic demand.  
 
It is now acknowledged by the policy makers that the design of housing and property 
schemes of the CPF has led to over investment in these areas. Maintaining property   7
prices, especially of residential housing has become a vital political necessity, but this 
substantially constraints restructuring of the CPF system (Lee 2004). 
 
Another example of the design dilemma concerns health care.  Because of inherent 
market failure in health care due to asymmetric information and adverse selection, 
and due to importance of access to health insurance, there is a strong case for 
mandatory requirement for purchase of health insurance. In the CPF’s catastrophic 
illness insurance scheme i.e., Medishield, there is an  opting-out provision
4; the 
premiums vary with age; and the scheme does not currently cover those above 80 
years of age, an age when such insurance is all the more socially compelling. 
Moreover, only around 25 to 30 per cent of hospital bill is covered by Medishield 
insurance (Lim 2001). As at September 2003, only about half of Singapore’s citizens 
and residents were covered by Medishield insurance.  
 
The above design of health care schemes under the CPF is inconsistent with efficient, 
equitable and accessible health care provisions. The government’s objective appears 
to be to minimize its own liabilities for provision of health care and make individuals 
responsible for financing health care. It is therefore not surprising that before the 
health schemes were introduced under the CPF, the total national health expenditure 
accounted for by the public sector was 75 per cent and the private sector share was 25 
per cent, roughly in line with the other high income countries. But the CPF schemes 
have contributed to reversing this ratio over the last twenty years. 
 
With Singapore’s rapid aging, increasing use of technology in the health care sector 
and high level of demand due to affluence, the current share of individual financing is 
unsustainable. There however does not appear much awareness among the policy 
makers of the urgent need to begin to reduce the share of national health expenditure 
borne by the individuals. It should be noted that the health financing schemes of the 
CPF have also reduced the retirement financing of the individuals. This is because a 
portion of the contributions to the CPF has been used for health care in the working   8
years. Moreover, the amounts accumulated in the Medisave account can not be 
withdrawn until death. 
  
The inappropriate design of the CPFIS scheme resulting in high transactions costs to the 
members is discussed in the next sub-section. 
 
2.3 Investment Policies and Performance  
 
Investment policies should permit effective diversification of assets, and help maximize 
risk-adjusted rate of return net of transaction and investment management costs and taxes. 
This is an important aspect of the fiduciary responsibility of the governing board of the 
provident or pension fund.  
 
The CPF balance sheet states that all of S$102 billion of members’ balances are invested 
in non-marketable government securities.  The interest paid on securities is a weighted 
sum of fixed deposit and saving deposit interest rates; and is determined quarterly. The 
government guarantees a nominal interest rate of 2.5%. While the CPF savings are for the 
long term, the members are administratively provided returns applicable to short term 
funds.  
 
While the government issues non-marketable bonds, in actuality, as the government has 
been consistently enjoying budget surpluses (Asher 2003), proceeds from the bonds are 
turned over to Singapore Government Investment Corporation (SGIC) for investments. 
The operations of the SGIC (and other government investment holding companies such 
as Temasek Holdings) do not have to be revealed, even to the Parliament or the President 
of the country, because of statutory provisions. The CPF balances ultimately however are 
widely believed to have been almost wholly invested abroad. 
 
There is thus a disconnect between the administered interest rate paid on CPF balances 
and the actual investments and returns obtained. This is not consistent with transparency 
requirements, and the fiduciary responsibilities of internationally benchmarked provident   9
or pension funds. The political risk inherent in this arrangement is also very high.  
Predominant role of the government in Singapore in the savings – investment 
intermediation process (result of large structural budget surpluses, substantial public 
sector, and mandatory CPF savings), has raised efficiency concerns (Asher 2003). 
 
This arrangement has not resulted in realizing the potential of the power of compound 
interest for members as shown in Figure 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The key relationship in Figure 1 is that the rate of return is considerably lower than the 
wage growth. This implies that the replacement rate will be fairly low. Somewhat higher 
rate of return obtained for insurance funds (which amounted to only S$3 billion in 2002) 
should also be noted. These funds, unlike the members’ balances ultimately invested by 
GSIS, are contracted-out to private fund managers. 
 
To the extent the government holding companies earn higher than what is paid to the CPF 
members, implicit tax on CPF wealth occurs. IMF has estimated that the Singapore 
Government Investment Corporation (SGIC) earned about 10.0 percent per annum during 
the 1990s, substantially higher than the average nominal return of 3.4 percent credited by 
the CPF. The implicit tax for 2000 is (10.0-3.4=6.6) times $90.3 billion, or $5.96 billion, 
equivalent to 42 percent of contributions or 3.75 percent of GDP. The implicit tax is 
recurrent, and it is regressive as low-income individuals hold proportionally greater 
wealth in the form of CPF balances. At the minimum, the implicit tax is the difference 
between what is earned on insurance funds and the returns to members on their balance 
as shown in Figure 1.  
 
Moreover, as only about a third of the labor force pays personal income tax, the low-
income members do not receive tax subsidy for contribution, income on pre-retirement 
investments, and at the time of withdrawal. The cost of nominal rate of return guarantee 
of 2.5 percent is quite small, and does not counterbalance such a large implicit tax.    10
 
2.3.1 The CPFIS Scheme: In contrast to investments by the CPF Board, this scheme is a 
pre-retirement withdrawal scheme. A member may open a CPF investment account with 
approved agent banks, all of whom are locally controlled banks. Their charges and fees are 
not regulated. Individual CPF members may invest their Ordinary Account balance as well 
as Special Account balance in approved assets. There is no limit on investments in shares 
through the approved Unit Trusts. 
 
There has been substantial liberalization of the CPF scheme over the years. As a result, 
members can currently exercise option for international diversification. But risks of such 
option remain high, particularly given relatively low level of financial literacy. The realized 
profits must be re-deposited in the CPF account and therefore can not be withdrawn. This 
may give rise to the lock-in effect, i.e. individuals may hold on to a particular stock for 
longer than the optimum time period. 
 
Traditionally, the CPF Board annually released the realized gains and losses on an 
aggregative basis. The unrealized gains and losses were not released, and therefore a 
fuller picture of investment performance under the CPFIS was not possible even at an 
aggregative level.  
 
However, the CPF Board has recently released data on the investment choices and 
performance of the CPF members who have invested under the CPFIS Scheme, 
incorporating both the realized and unrealized gains and losses on different instruments 
(www.cpf.gov.sg). It is to be hoped that the CPF Board will release similar data on an 
annual basis.  
 
Tables 3A and 3B provide the officially released data for investments from the Ordinary 
Account (OA) and Special Account (SA) respectively. It should be noted that the 
reported data refer to values as at September 30, 2003 which do not include transactions 
costs of investments, and any applicable taxes. So the published returns are over-stated.   
   11
The following observations may be made from the data in Tables 3 A and 3B.  
 
(Insert Table 3A and Table 3B here) 
 
(i) As at 30
th September 2003, $28.1 billion was invested through the CPFIS; and the rate 
of return obtained on the whole portfolio under the OA was negative 14.77 percent, and 
on the SA it was negative 6.87 percent. If transactions costs, including investment 
management costs, and taxes were included the returns would be even more unfavorable. 
 
(ii) Insurance products have been the most favorite form of CPFIS instrument among the 
members. Among these products, role of annuities has been minor; while endowment 
policies have been the most important.  
On insurance products, the unrealized losses were $ 802 million, equivalent to 5.77 
percent of total investments. 
 
(iii) Less than 5 percent of the 3 million members are invested through unit-trusts. In 
contrast, nearly twice as many CPF members have invested through a far more risky 
route of individual share selection.  
 
The unrealized losses on the investments in unit trusts from the OA were 14.11 percent, 
while from the SA, they were 5.07 percent. In contrast, on shares invested by the 
members on their own, the losses were -32.64% for the OA. Such investments are not 
permitted from the SA. 
 
The above pattern of investments and performance of the CPFIS suggests that it has been 
used by only a small proportion (no more than a sixth) of members. Thus, for the bulk of 
CPF members, this avenue appears to be not a preferred one. They rely on the returns 
from the members balances.  
 
The above analysis also suggests that the participating members have invested in the 
main on insurance products, and on their own in the individual stocks. Both these choices   12
are unlikely to be consistent with sound investment strategies for retirement. Given only 
small amounts invested through unit trusts, and the oligopolistic nature of the asset 
management industry, it would not be surprising to find high expense ratios and large 
differences between offer and bid prices.  
The expense ratios, calculated by dividing a fund’s annual operating costs by the total 
value of assets under its management, have predictably been quite high. Thus, as at 
September 30, 2003, the CPF approved unit trusts with medium to high risks had median 
expense ratios of 1.92, and for higher risk unit trusts, the ratio was 2.23, substantially 
higher than the 1 per cent expense target (www.cpf.gov.sg). In Singapore, 5 to 7 percent 
spread between the offer and bid (buy and sell) prices by the unit trusts are not 
uncommon. 
 
Professional investment management is expensive, and the CPFIS design has not 
encouraged economies of scale in fund management. It has perhaps encouraged large 
number of fund managers to set up operation in Singapore, a goal not necessarily 
consistent with the fiduciary responsibilities of a provident fund. 
 
It can thus be summarized that there are inherent design limitations of the CPFIS scheme, 
and this has contributed to it not being successful. Proposed changes to the CPFIS, such 
as permitting members to also invest in pension funds
5 can not be expected to make 
material difference. 
 
2.3.2 Adequacy Issue and the CPF 
 
The adequacy issue of retirement financing is conventionally measured by the 
replacement ratio, i.e. value of an annuity during retirement as a percentage of pre-
retirement income. The replacement rate at retirement will however will not be sustained 
unless the annuity amount is indexed for inflation. Thus it is important to analyze the 
replacement rates throughout the retirement period. There is also an issue of longevity 
risk as the annuity purchased from accumulated balances under a mandatory savings or 
other such defined contribution schemes may be either spent too quickly or too slowly   13
during retirement. It is the former which has significance for public policy because if a 
person is left with too few resources in old age due to longer life, society may need to 
take the responsibility for provision of adequate income. As women live longer than men 
on the average, but usually have lower exposure to labor force and earn less than men on 
the average, there is also a gender issue that needs to be addressed.  
 
The CPF Board usually does not provide data on the cash balances by age and sex, nor 
does it provide the balances withdrawn at age 55. However, in 2000, cash balances of 
contributors (43 percent of total members) were provided on an ad-hoc basis (Table 4). 
The data suggest that even for the 50 to 55 age group, nearly two-thirds of the 
contributors had balances of less than $100,000. The average balance for active 
contributors 53,600 equivalent to 1.27 times the per capita GNP. These balances are 
indeed inadequate to finance retirement of more than 20 years duration on the average. 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
The generic reasons for low balances include highly unequal wage structure, high rate of 
pre-retirement withdrawals, low returns credited to members, and high transactions costs 
of investments. Converting property values into retirement income stream through 
reverse mortgage suffers from severe technical problems and high transactions costs 
(Asher, 2003).    
 
A simulation study by McCarthy et al. (2002) suggests that for the base case the 
replacement rate was 28 percent of the final earnings provided the withdrawal age were 
increased from 55 to 62 years (Table 5). They also conducted a sensitivity analysis of the 
impact of various potential policy changes (Table 6). The analysis suggested that 
lowering of the contribution rates from 40 percent to 30 percent will reduce the base case 
replacement rate to 14 percent; and if the CPF contribution wage-ceiling is held at $6000 
per month without any adjustment for inflation, the replacement rate will fall to 17 
percent.  
   14
(Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here) 
 
The policymakers in Singapore have already reduced the contribution rate to 33 per cent 
from October 1, 2003 from 36 per cent applicable at the time of the simulation study. 
Further reductions in the contribution rates can not be ruled out. They have also 
announced plans to reduce the CPF wage ceiling to $4,500 by January 2006 from $6,000 
when the simulation study was undertaken. The combined impact of these measures will 
be to reduce the replacement rate at best to between 10-15 percent. This is clearly 
inadequate and shows the limitations of reliance on single-tier mandatory savings scheme 
to finance retirement. 
 
2.4 Continued Reliance on a Single-tier System? 
 
The pension literature over the last decade has suggested that different tiers are 
necessary to address different types of risk; and that a multiple-tier pension system is 
to be preferred on social, economic and political grounds then near-exclusive reliance 
on a single-tier. Singapore’s government’s ideology has been strongly opposed to 
introducing the any social risk pooling arrangements, even when it is clear that the 
current near-exclusive reliance on a single tier will not provide adequate replacement 
rate.  
 
The crux of the dilemma lies in the fact that Singapore’s policies have been 
predicated on the basis of continuous high growth and requirements of being a 
business center. But an affluent and rapidly aging society experiences inevitable 
moderation in growth and an educated population has a tendency to express the need 
for genuine participation and voice in the running of the country. Thus the 
requirements of being a business center and demands of wanting to be a country 
eventually come into conflict. Singapore is showing signs of reaching this stage. The 
political economy of Singapore will therefore be crucial in whether the mindset set 
change comes about to accommodate the objective need to shift away from a single-
tier to a multi-tier social security system.    15
3. Reform Directions 
 
The analysis in the previous section has strongly suggested that the current retirement 
financing system of Singapore is unsustainable and is in urgent need of fundamental 
reforms designed to address various dilemmas discussed earlier. The following 
reforms are suggested in the current single-tier retirement financing system.  
 
1.  Reforms should result in much higher priority to fiduciary responsibility by the 
CPF Board; greater transparency of the investment process and outcome; and 
lower transactions costs. 
 
2.   The CPF Board should have independent and competent members regulated by 
the newly constituted Provident Fund Authority (PFA).  
 
3.   Between 10 to 15 percentage points of the CPF contributions should be diverted 
to the asset management company (with the rest for housing, health are, and 
others) remaining with the current CPF Board. 
 
4.  Formation of a separate asset management company with statutory requirement 
for fiduciary responsibilities and transparency should be considered. 
 
5.  Over the medium term (2 to 4 years) current accumulated balances of $102 billion 
should be transferred to the new asset management company. 
 
6.  The current CPFIS scheme should be restructured to restrict individual choice and 
the funds should be also centrally managed.  
 
7.  The new asset management company can use its expertise and large pool of funds 
to provide choice to members to allocate their balances among limited number of 
portfolios of differing risk-return profile. A member may be given a choice to 
reallocate the portfolio every three to four years. Since the behavioral finance   16
literature (Mitchell and Utkus 2003) suggests that many individuals do not re-
balance their portfolio towards more conservative investments as they get older, 
some provision for default option incorporating this feature may be built into the 
scheme.  
 
8.  The new asset management company can take advantage of its large pool of funds 
to reduce transactions and investment management costs; and to provide effective 
diversification of the portfolio while giving due weight to transparency. This is 
likely to encourage the funds management industry in Singapore on a more 
sustainable and financially viable basis.  
 
Reforms are also required in the third-tier voluntary savings scheme i.e. the SRS; 
and in the tax treatment of pension providers and products. The SRS needs to be 
restructured to be more attractive to voluntary savers for retirement. As formal 
employer-employee relationship less of a norm due to globalization, restructuring 
should take this into account. 
 
The tax treatment of both CPF-approved annuities and those provided by the         
private sector needs to be evenhanded. Currently, the latter are discriminated       
against as they are taxed while the CPF-approved annuities are not taxed. Similarly,    
tax disincentives against company pension schemes need to be removed. Currently,   
only the CPF contributions are effectively tax deductible. The monopoly of the CPF 
thus needs to be ended in the above areas.  
 
 Even if the above reforms are undertaken, theoretical and empirical evidence (Orzag 
and Stiglitz 2001; Gill et al 2003; and Mitchell and Utkus 2003) strongly suggests 
that a single-tier system will not be able to provide adequate retirement income 
security, and will not be able to diversify risks. Globalization has increased the 
necessity for strong social security systems and safety nets.  
   17
A strong case can be made for Singapore to introduce tax financed schemes to 
address the needs of the lifetime poor (through the zero-pillar social assistance 
scheme); and social risk pooling first-tier to address longevity and inflation risks.  
This case has become even stronger due to the unilateral alteration of the implicit 
social contract by the government. This contract provided for acceptance of 
government’s socio-economic engineering and political control in return for job 
security and full employment. The government is not able to fulfill the latter element, 
but still wants to continue to undertake socio-economic engineering and maintain 
political control. This is a disequilibrium situation which will need to be resolved. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Over the last half century, Singapore has evolved a large and complex mandatory 
savings scheme administered by the CPF. The socio-economic engineering and 
political control objectives have been important revealed objectives of the CPF 
scheme. Rapid growth and relatively young demographic profile until recently have 
permitted Singapore to pursue growth strategy in general, and retirement financing 
strategy in particular, based on it being a business centre rather than a country. What 
may have been acceptable during the earlier phase of development however may not 
be so as affluent and rapidly aging Singapore attempts to meet the challenges of 
globalization and increased internal demands for participation and appropriate social 
and economic institutions. 
 
In the area of retirement financing, this is demonstrated by the objective need to shift 
from a single tier system based on mandatory savings to a multiple tier system. The 
paper has argued that constraints in making this shift are neither fiscal or other 
resources, nor technical and institutional capacities. The major constraint is the mind-
set of the policymakers which does not perceive any need to alter the fundamental 
aspects of political economy, growth strategy, or retirement financing. Until such 
mind set change occurs, parametric reforms in the CPF system and related areas may   18
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Table 2 
 
Various Schemes under Singapore’s CPF System 
 
Type Scheme  Year  Introduced 
Approved Housing 
Scheme 




Singapore Bus Services 






















Medishield Scheme  1990 
Insurance 






Medisave Scheme  1984 
Minimum Sum Scheme  1987 
Topping-up of the 
Minimum Sum Scheme 
1987 
Loans for Tertiary 
Education in Singapore 
1989 
Others 
CPF Top-up Scheme  1995 
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Table 3 
CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS) 























100%  Insurance  405, 900 13, 897.03 13, 095.48 -801.56  -5.77%
 Unit  Trusts  124,100 2,461.93 2,114.44 -347.49  -14.11%
 Others  - 123.76 126.47 2.71  2.20%
35% Shares  277,200 7,244.33 4,880.09 -2,364.24  -32.64%
 Others  4.99 5.94 0.95  19.1%
10% Gold  8.01 10.18 2.16  27.01%
  TOTAL 23,740.05 20,232.59 -3.507.45  -14.77%
 














 ($ million) 
Unrealise





100% Insurance  346,600  3,650.51  3,386.36  -264.15  -7.24% 
 Unit  Trusts  76,500  719.56  683.11  -36.46  -5.07% 
 Others    4.82  4.83  0.01  - 
  TOTAL   4,374.90  4,074.29  -300.60  -6.87% 
 
Source: Calculated from the data provided in the CPF website (www.cpf.com.sg) 
Notes: 
a.  It should be kept in mind that individuals may have invested in more than one instrument, 
and through both the OA and SA avenues, simply adding up the number of individuals in 
each category will result in substantial upward bias in number of CPF members who have 
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T Ta ab bl le e   4 4   
   
S Si in ng ga ap po or re e: :   C Ca as sh h   B Ba al la an nc ce es s   o of f   C CP PF F   C Co on nt tr ri ib bu ut to or rs s   b by y   A Ag ge e   a as s   o of f   D De ec ce em mb be er r, ,   2 20 00 00 0   
   



































































>80-<100 97.8   
(7.7) 




























>200 29.4   
(2.3) 


























   
   
Source: Based on data supplied by the CPF Board; Annual Report of the CPF Board, 2000. 
Notes: figures in brackets represent percentages.  Total net balances (defined as balances after 
the pre-retirement withdrawals for housing, healthcare, investments, etc.) at December 2000, 
were $68,221.5 million, and active contributors numbered 1.273 million, providing an average 
balance of $53,600 equivalent to 1.27 times the per capita GNP.  The active contributors in 
December 2000 were 58.1% of the labor force, and 44% of the total members numbering 2.9 
million.  By deduction, ($90,298.3 – $68,221.5) the average balance for the 1.6 million inactive 
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T Ta ab bl le e   5 5   
   
E Es st ti im ma at te ed d   E Ea ar rn ni in ng gs s   a an nd d   T To ot ta al l   A As ss se et ts s, ,   W We ea al lt th h   A Al ll lo oc ca at ti io on n   a an nd d   R Re ep pl la ac ce em me en nt t   
R Ra at te e   f fo or r   B Ba as se e   C Ca as se e   
   
A As ss se et t   A Al ll lo oc ca at ti io on n   
( (% %      o of f      t to ot ta al l) )   
Implied RR: Retirement 
Income/Final Earnings 
(%) 











Housing Mortgage O Ot th he er r   Earnings Subsistence
50 60.9  1093.5  15  6  76  -4  7  17  120 
55 67.3  1384.1  16  6  73  -1  6  23  202 
60 74.3  1659.1  14  5  74  0  6  26  268 
62 77.3  1774.3  14  5  75  0  6  28  296 
65 82.0  1955.9  13  5  77  0  5  30  343 
      
Notes: Author’s (McCarthy et al.) calculation; assumes male head of household married to 
same age non-working wife. 
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T Ta ab bl le e   6 6   
S Se en ns si it ti iv vi it ty y   o of f   R Re es su ul lt ts s   t to o   P Po ot te en nt ti ia al l   P Po ol li ic cy y   C Ch ha an ng ge es s   
 














1.  Base Case  1774.3  7 75 5% %   
 
28% 296%  582% 
CPF Changes 
2 .   B o t h  C P F  
Accts ROR up 
from 0% /1.5 
% to 5% real 
2052.6  6 65 5% %    3 34 4% %    3 35 59 9% %    4 4. .6 60 0% %   
3.  % to 
Special CPF 
Acct up from 
4%  to 8% 
1800.3  7 74 4% %    3 30 0% %    3 31 19 9% %    5 5. .3 34 4% %   
4.  CPF 
contribution 
ceiling held at 
0% nominal 
instead of 0% 
real 
1598.5  8 83 3% %    1 17 7% %    1 18 86 6% %    5 5. .2 23 3% %   
5.  CPF 
contribution 
rates lowered 
from 40% to 
30% 
1604.6  8 83 3% %    1 14 4% %    1 14 48 8% %   4.61% 
HDB Changes 
6 6. .    R RO OR R    o on n   
H HD DB B   p pr ro op pe er rt ty y   
f fa al ll ls s    4 4% %    r re ea al l   
t to o   0 0% %   r re ea al l   
768.5  3 36 6% %    3 32 2% %    3 33 39 9% %    0 0. .7 77 7% %   
7 7. .    R RO OR R    o on n   
H HD DB B   p pr ro op pe er rt ty y   
4 4% %    r re ea al l- -> >1 10 0   
y ye ea ar rs s, ,   0 0% %   r re ea al l   
t th he er re ea af ft te er r   
7 74 49 9. .1 1    3 37 7% %    3 30 0% %    3 32 22 2% %  0 0. .4 47 7% %   
8 8. .    R RO OR R    o on n   
H HD DB B   p pr ro op pe er rt ty y   
0 0% %    r re ea al l- -> >1 10 0   
y ye ea ar rs s, ,   4 4% %   r re ea al l   
t th he er re ea af ft te er r   
1 17 79 97 7. .6 6    7 74 4% %    3 30 0% %   316%  6.04% 
9 9. .H HD DB B    r re es sa al le e   
l le ev vy y   f fa al ll ls s   f fr ro om m   
2 22 2. .5 5% %/ /2 25 5% %    t to o   
0 0% %   
2 22 29 96 6. .2 2    7 77 7% %    3 34 4% %   364%  7.42% 
Notes: Author’s (McCarthy et al.) calculation; assumes male head of household married to same age 
non-working wife. 


























Real Rate of 
Return  on 
Insurance
Funds




Real GDP Real GDP
Real Wage
Real Rate of 
Return on 
Balances





Singapore's CPF: Average Annual Compound Growth 
Rate (AACGR %)
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ENDNOTES 
 
                                                 
1  In 2002, Singapore’s per capita Gross National Income (GNP) was S$36, 909 (US$21, 091). Its total 
population was 4.2 million, while its resident population was 3.4 million. Singapore does not publish the 
division of residents into Singapore citizens and permanent residents (ROS: DOS, 2003). The above figures 
reflect substantial reliance of Singapore on foreign manpower. Singapore’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in 
2003 was 1.3, substantially below the replacement rate of 2.1. The TFR has been below replacement rate 
since 1975. Life expectancy at birth for males was 76.8 in 2002, while for females it was 80.6.  (Source: 
Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2003). 
 
2 A voluntary tax-advantaged retirement scheme, called Supplementary Retirement Scheme (SRS) was 
introduced in April 2001, but its impact has been very limited.  Details of the SRS are available from the 
following website. http://www.mof.gov.sg/taxation/home_user/srs/tax_hme_srshtml 
 
 
3  The CPF does do a commendable job of providing information to each member on his or her own 
account details. The point referred to in the text concerns making available data such as cash balances of 
the members by age and sex, distribution of cash balances withdrawn at age 55 etc.  
 
 
4 Under this provision, a member is deemed to have opted for it unless explicit instructions are given to the 
CPF Board to the contrary. 
 
5 See http://www.cpf.gov.sg  for the proposal. The CPF Board argues that the pension funds will be 
structured in such a way as to maximize the expense ratio. But if such products are in addition to current 
menu of CPFIS instruments, volumes are unlikely to be large enough to bring about this result. 